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THE EFFICACY OF INDEFINITE 
DETENTION: ASSESSMENT OF 










 As the doors of Guantanamo, the ultimate symbol of the 
war on terror, begin to close, the government is faced with a 
herculean task of prosecuting (within federal or military 
tribunals), transferring, or releasing detainees it has held for 
over seven years. Since 2002, there have been over 600 
Guantanamo detainees who have been released or 
transferred.
1
 Currently, of the 172 detainees that remain, sixty 
are no longer designated enemy combatants or have no lawful 
designation justifying continued detention.
2
   
 Within this group are seventeen Uighurs,
3
 Turkic 
Muslims, who fled to Afghanistan from China because of 
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1
  News Release, Detainee Transfer Announced, U.S. Department of 
Defense (Sept. 16, 2010). 
2
  John Wesley Hall, Withering Uighurs, 33-APR CHAMP 5 (2009). 
Human Rights Watch, U.S. Indefinite Detention Authorized but Restricted 
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2011/03/07/us-indefinite-
detention-authorized-restricted.   
3
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. 
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religious/ political persecution.
4
 After the 2002 bombings in 
the Tora Bora region, they fled again to Pakistan where they 
were subsequently turned over by bounty hunters to U.S. 
forces.
5
 Even after eight years of detention and the Bush 
administration's removal of the enemy combatant 




 This note discusses the potential indefinite detention, also 
called preventative detention, of the Uighur detainees.
7
 Until 
early 2010, the U.S. Government had been unable to resettle 
seventeen Uighurs for over 5 years.
8
 In 2009, the Supreme 
Court, granted certiorari on the issue of whether federal 
courts have the authority to ―order the release of prisoners 
held at Guantanamo Bay 'where the Executive detention is 
indefinite and without authorization in law, and release into 
the continental United States is the only possible effective 
remedy.‘‖
9
 However, on March 1, 2010, the Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded the case to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (hereinafter 
―Circuit Court II‖) after each detainee had ―received at least 
one offer of resettlement in another country.‖
10
   
                                                          
4
  Mark Memmott, China Has Executed Nine Uighurs, NPR (Nov. 9, 
2009), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2009/11/china_has_executed_nine_uighur.html (recently nine 
Uighurs were executed in China for ethnic violence that was spurred by 
government policies).    
5
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 35 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
935637; Michael Price, Guantanamo Update, 33-NOV CHAMP 55 
(2009) ($85,000 was the amount given for the 17 Uighurs). 
6
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 559 U.S. __(2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010) (per 
curiam).   
7
  See generally In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 
2d 33 (D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 
(D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
935637. 
8
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555, F.3d 1022, 1033 n.2 (2009), vacated, 130 
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637 (Rogers, J. 
concurring). 
9
  Kiyemba v. Obama 559, U.S. __ (2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010).     
10
 Id. 
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 Although the Circuit Court II must now confront a new 
question on whether a detainee who is denied an offer for 
relocation can be released into the U.S, it will likely still have 
to grapple with the lawfulness of either indefinitely detaining 
or releasing petitioners into the U.S. As the petitioners have 
contended in their most recent reply,
11
 ―there is no admissible 
record evidence that there is, today, somewhere else to go.‖
12
 
In this note, we will assume either the legitimacy of the 
detainees‘ refusal to resettle or that such refusal has no 
bearing on the detainees‘ right to be released in the U.S.
13
 
Ultimately, this leaves the government with only two options: 
(1) indefinite detention
14
 or (2) their release into the U.S.
15
 
The initial grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court on Oct. 
20, 2009 revealed the manifest importance of addressing this 
issue, yet with the subsequent order to vacate and remand, the 
implications of such policy still remain unsettled.
16
 Even with 
the Supreme Court's attempt to avoid the fundamental 
question of indefinite detention,   they will likely have to 
revisit this issue in the near future.
17
  
 This note will be limited to assessing the application of 
Supreme Court immigration cases to Kiyemba by first laying 
out the detailed procedural history. Legal arguments 
presented between In re Guantanamo Detainee Litigation 
(United States District Court, District of Columbia 
(hereinafter ―District Court‖ )) and Kiyemba v. Obama 
(United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit (hereinafter ―Circuit Court I‖)) are examined next.  
                                                          
11
  See generally Brief for Petitioner, Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 08-
5424 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
12
  Id. at 4 n.1. 
13
  Petitioner's argue that the remedy of the "Great Writ is not 
transportation to a distant island."  Id. at 13. 
14
  The government and the Circuit Court I used the more benign term 
of ―harborage‖ to designate individuals who are unable to be released into 
the U.S. and who are therefore currently being ―housed‖ in Guantanamo. 
15
  See Kiyemba v. Obama 559, U.S. __ (2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 
(2010) (discussing the issues before the Supreme Court prior to its 
decision to vacate and remand).    
16
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. 
17
  Id. 
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The Note then analyzes the relevant Supreme Court 
immigration case law that formed the basis of the judgment 
on merits used in both the District and Circuit Court I before 
the most recent vacatur. Lastly, the Note concludes with a 
potential solution or balanced measure that may 
accommodate the sovereignty and liberty interests at stake. 
II. BACKGROUND & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
18
 
 The Uighurs, a Turkic Muslim minority group, fled China 
and lived in Uighur camps in Afghanistan and then 
Pakistan.
19
 It was originally disputed whether these camps 
were controlled by East Turkistan Islamic Movement 
(hereinafter ―ETIM‖) and what role the Taliban had in 
supporting these camps.
20
 Once the Uighurs were present in 
Pakistan, local officials turned them over to Pakistani 
officials.
21
 Subsequently, the Uighurs were turned over to the 
U.S. military for $5,000 per individual.
22
   
 On July 29, 2005, Houzaifa Parhat and eight other 
Uighurs sought habeas relief (Kiyemba v. Bush) from their 
imprisonment in Guantanamo.
23
 The case was stayed pending 
the resolution of Boumediene v. Bush.
24
 During the interim 
period, Mr. Parhat filed a petition with the D.C. Circuit Court 
of Appeals under the Detainee Treatment Act (hereinafter 
―DTA‖). After the ruling in Boumediene on June 12, 2008, 
                                                          
18
  See Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama: 
Timeline, http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush 
(last visited June 22, 2010) for more detail on the timeline and procedural 
history. 
19
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 34-35 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
935637. 
20
  Id. at 38. 
21
  Id. at 35. 
22
  Id.  
23
  Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
24
  Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama: Timeline, 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush (last visited 
June 22, 2010). 
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the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided Parhat v. Gates.
25
 
In this decision, the Court found that the designation of 
―enemy combatant‖ as applied to petitioners was invalid and 
ordered either the release, transfer, or new Combatant Status 
Review Tribunal (hereinafter  ―CSRT‖) to review the 
evidence in light of the Court's opinion. 
 On July 10, 2008, all habeas petitions on behalf of the 
seventeen Uighurs were consolidated as Kiyemba v. Bush 
under the guidance of Judge Ricardo M. Urbina.
26
 Soon 
thereafter on August 4, 2008, the government informed the 
District Court that it would not convene a new CSRT for Mr. 
Parhat.
27
 After multiple hearings with the government, Judge 
Urbina ordered the release of the seventeen Uighur prisoners 
on October 8, 2008.
28
 Immediately, the government sought an 
emergency stay which the Circuit Court I granted the 
following day.
29
  Eventually, the Circuit Court I granted a 
stay pending expedited appeal where it reversed the district 
court's decision on February 18, 2009.
30
 Petitioners 
subsequently filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which was 
granted on October 20, 2009.
31
 On March 1, 2010, the 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded to the Circuit Court II 
based on the offer of resettlement to each petitioner, arguing 
                                                          
25
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 33, 34 
(D.D.C. 2008). 
26
  Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama: Timeline, 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush (last visited 
June 22, 2010). 
27
  Id. 
28
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 43 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
935637. 
29
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555, F.3d 1022, 1024 n.2 (2009), vacated, 
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. (Rogers, J. 
concurring). 
30
  Center for Constitutional Rights, Kiyemba v. Obama: Timeline, 
http://ccrjustice.org/ourcases/current-cases/kiyemba-v.-bush (last visited 
June 22, 2010).  
31
  Kiyemba v. Obama 559, U.S. __ (2010); 130 S.Ct. 1235 (2010) 
(per curiam).     
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that, ―[n]o court has yet ruled in this case in light of the new 
facts, and we decline to be the first to do so.‖
32
 
III.  LEGAL ARGUMENTS: DISTRICT COURT VS. CIRCUIT COURT 
A.   District Court (Judge Ricardo M. Urbina): The Scope of 
Executive Power Regarding ―Wind Up‖ Authority & the 
Power to Exclude 
 Under In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, the 
District Court held that: (1) continued detention exceeds the 
government's authority to ―wind up‖ the wartime detention 
and (2) that the District Court has the authority to order the 
release of detainees into the U.S.
33
 
 At the outset of his decision, Judge Urbina acknowledged 
that the ―government has absolved the petitioners‖ of their 
enemy combatant status, and assuming that the ―petitioners 
were lawfully detained,‖ that the Executive possessed some 
inherent rights to ―wind up‖ detentions.
34
 ―Wind up‖ 
authority, in times of war, allows the Executive reasonable 
time for the repatriation of Prisoners of War (hereinafter 
―POWs‖).
35
 The District Court cited the framework for 





These decisions reasoned that a removable alien is subject to 
a presumptively lawful period of detention for six months.
38
  
However, the District Court conceded that these cases were 
not ―strictly analogous‖ to the instant case.
39
  
 In contrast, the government's position, as stated by the 
District Court, was that POWs had been detained for years 
                                                          
32
  Id. (citing See, e.g., Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 718, n.7 
(2005) ("[W]e are a court of review, not of first view.")). 
33
  Id. at 36-39, 43. 
34
  Id. at 36. 
35
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 36 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
935637. 
36
  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
37
  Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
38
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 37. 
39
  Id. 
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after the cessation of hostilities and that the clock for these 
detainees began to accrue from the time the government 
abandoned its new CSRT.
40
 Furthermore, the government 
looked at Mezei
41
 as controlling law. Here, the government 
argued that Mezei was permanently excluded from entry into 
the U.S., harbored on Ellis Island, and that no country was 
willing to receive him.
42
 Further, the government emphasized 
that the ―right to enter the United States depends on 
congressional will, and the courts cannot substitute their 
judgment for the legislative mandate.‖
43
 
 Judge Urbina disagreed that Mezei controlled since it was 
never intended to decide matters of indefinite detention, 
whereas, Zadvydas and Clark were specifically concerned 
with this severe imposition. Consequently, the District Court 
found that Mezei had been undermined by subsequent case 
law and is distinguishable to the instant case because 
petitioner was never aware of the evidence used against him 
and came voluntarily to the U.S.
44
   
 Finally, in discussing the power to admit or exclude 
aliens, the District Court readily conceded that ―the power to 
expel or exclude aliens [i]s a fundamental sovereign attribute 
. . . largely immune from judicial control.‖
45
 Yet, Judge 
Urbina did not feel the language itself spoke in absolute 
terms; and therefore, argued for governmental adherence to 
procedural due process.
46
 Additionally, the District Court 
found that the historical weight of precedent cut against 
absolute deference.
47
 Thus, Judge Urbina concluded that the 
                                                          
40
  Id. at 36-37 (The new CSRT was abandoned in August of 2009.). 
41
  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953). 
42
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 37 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
935637 (quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 207). 
43
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 37 
(quoting Mezei, 345 U.S. at 216). 
44
  Id. (citing Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208-09). 
45
  Id. at 40 (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977)). 
46
  Id. at 40. 
47
  Id. at 42. 
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judicial branch had an obligation to intervene when so 
required by the Constitution.
48
 
B.  Circuit Court (Judge Randolph Majority Opinion): 
Response to District Court's Assertion Regarding the 
Executive's Limited Right to Exclude 
 In reversing and remanding the District Court decision, 
Circuit Court I held that the federal courts lacked the proper 
authorization to review the Executive's exclusion decision.
49
 
The majority relied on historical principles that guided 




 First, Circuit Court I invoked the ancient Roman principle 
that a ―nation-state has the inherent right to exclude or admit 
foreigners and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions 
for their exclusion or admission.‖
51
 This principle can be 
found in Madison's reports during the Constitutional 
Convention.
52
 Additionally, for more than a century, the 
Supreme Court has recognized the sovereign right of the 
political branches to exclude aliens beginning with the 
Chinese Exclusion Case.
53
 Judge Randolph, who was part of 
the majority in Circuit Court I, went on to quote Justice 
Frankfurter's declaration that the rights of noncitizens rests 




 The second argument presented by the Circuit Court I 
attacks the basis for the District Court's reliance on Zadvydas 
and Martinez while elevating Mezei, which the Court found 
                                                          
48
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 42 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
935637. 
49
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1029-1035 (2009), vacated, 
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. 
50
  See generally id. 
51
  Id. at 1025. 
52
  Id. at n.5. 
53
  Id. at 1025. 
54
  Id. at 1026. 
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―analogous to [Kiyemba] . . . in several ways.‖
55
 As stated 
previously, upon Mezei's return to the U.S., he was denied 
entry at the border and efforts to resettle him elsewhere 
failed.
56
 What the Circuit Court I gleaned from Mezei's ruling 
was a rejection of the District Court's assertion that the 
judiciary has the authority to release petitioners into the 
U.S.
57
 In addition, the Circuit Court I found that Zadvydas 
and Martinez dealt with interpretation of immigration laws 
not the Constitution.  Zadvydas was further distinguished 
because it involved an alien who had already entered the 
U.S.
58
 In sum, the Circuit Court I asserted that no habeas 




IV. THE SCOPE OF EXECUTIVE & JUDICIAL AUTHORITY: THE 
RIGHT TO ADMIT OR EXCLUDE, THE RIGHT TO RELEASE OR 
DETAIN 
 In assessing the arguments put forth by the District and 
Circuit Court I, our analysis will be supplemented by 
briefs/petitions submitted to the Circuit Court I & II and the 
Supreme Court. The crux of the analysis will focus on the 
major Supreme Court immigration cases that were heavily 
relied upon by both the parties and the courts. Even with the 
recent remand of the case to the Circuit Court II, if the Circuit 
Court II finds that there is no impact regarding a detainee‘s 
release into the U.S. because of his refusal to be exiled to a 
foreign land, the subsequent analysis of immigration case law 
remains highly relevant.  
                                                          
55
  Kiyemba v. Obama 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (2009), vacated, 130 
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. 
56
  Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 209 
(1953). 
57
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1027 (2009), vacated, 130 
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. 
58
  Id. at 1028. 
59
  Id.; But see, Brief for Petitioner at 10, Kiyemba v. Obama, No. 08-
5424 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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A.  The Role of Immigration Law in Kiyemba v. Obama 
In its opening brief to the Supreme Court, petitioners 
asserted that although the government and the Circuit Court I 
characterize petitioners' request for immigration relief; ―this 
has never been an immigration case.‖
60
 This is what makes 
the arguments on both sides so compelling. Nonetheless, 
immigration law is integral to the disposition of the remanded 
case. The most influential immigration cases in this litigation 
are Mezei, Zydvdays, and Martinez.  
1.  Mezei 
Both the Circuit Court I Majority in Kiyemba and the 
government heavily relied on Mezei, a cold war case litigated 
in the 1950s during both the Korean War and the McCarthy 
era.
61
 According to the government, the case stood as 
affirmation of the political branches supreme authority in the 
area of foreign policy and immigration.
62
 Similar to the 
Circuit Court I judgment, the court in Mezei had habeas 
jurisdiction and held that any decision regarding the entry of 
an alien belonged to the political branches of government and 
not the judiciary.
63
 This rationale is crucial in the 
Government's and Circuit Court's conclusion that the 
detainees are not unlawfully detained but excluded from 
entry. Consequently, their residence in Guantanamo Bay is 
tantamount to ―harborage‖ similar to Mezei's situation at Ellis 
Island.
64
 In validating this claim, the government pointed to 
the current benign conditions of the detainees‘ residence
65
 
                                                          
60
  Brief of Petitioners at 35, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536. 
61
  Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 
4, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
4759115. 
62
  Brief for the Respondents at 13-16, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 497333. 
63
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028 (2009), vacated, 130 
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. 
64
  Brief for the Respondents at 35-36, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 497333.  
65
  Id. at 9.   
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and their ability to leave Guantanamo Bay, if any country 
was willing to take them. 
Additionally, the Circuit Court draws a sharp distinction 
between ―simple release,‖ release of aliens into the country of 
their nationality/citizenship, versus release of aliens into the 
territory of the U.S, which the Circuit Court I believed fell 
outside the framework of immigration laws.
66
 This invariably 
led to the question of whether ―petitioners have a 
constitutional right to enter the United States . . . absent 
compliance with, federal immigration laws.‖
67
 Both the 
government and the Circuit Court I believed that well settled 
precedent of ―an unbroken string of  . . . decisions dating 
back more than a century‖ forecloses such possibility.
68
 
On the contrary, petitioners contended that the rationale 
behind excluding Mezei was based on the government‘s fear 
of foreign enemies dropping off potential spies to perform 
espionage
69
 and then forcing the Executive to allow them 
entry.
70
 Juxtaposing this rationale to the current situation 
where petitioners are here only at the Executive‘s behest, 
reveals two disparate factual scenarios. By equating the two, 
Mezei would stand for the proposition that the ―Executive is 
shielded from dilemmas of its own making.‖
71
 This is an 
untenable position.   
Furthermore, petitioners stated that their current detention 
had no legal basis, whereas Mezei‘s exclusion was based on 
statutory authorization.
72
 This is an important distinction 
since petitioners sought no relief through immigration 
                                                          
66
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1028 (2009), vacated, 130 
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637; Munaf v. Geren, 128 
S.Ct. 2207, 2221 (2008).  
67
  Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 13, Kiyemba v. Obama, 
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1526934. 
68
  Id. at 13-14. 
69
  Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 
11, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 
4759115 (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 
(1953) (No. 139)). 
70
  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 29, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 934097.  
71
  Id.  
72
  Id. 
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mechanisms.
73
 Irrespective of this fact, the Kiyemba majority 
(Circuit Court I) recast the discussion from a unilateral act of 
Executive authority to petitioners seeking admission into the 
U.S.
74
 Petitioners counter that there is no basis for 
immigration law to be triggered since they neither applied for 
immigration status nor sought entry at the border.
75
  
2.  Zadvydas & Martinez 
 If the Circuit Court I and the government are to be 
successful in using Mezei as a sword of absolute authority, as 
plenary power over immigration for the political branches, 
they must first penetrate petitioners' shield in the form of 
Zadvydas and Martinez.
76
 Petitioners forcefully argued that in 
limited circumstances the ―right to release - even of 
concededly undocumented aliens - has trumped the powers of 
the political branches over immigration.‖ The principle that 
arises from these two cases, and relied upon by Judge Urbina 
in his decision is that a presumptive period of six months 
detention is permitted.
77
 However, if after this period, 
removal to another country is not ―reasonably foreseeable,‖ 
conditional release is the only remedy.
78
   
 In contrast, the government and the Circuit Court I argued 
that Zadvydas, unlike petitioners, was living within the U.S. 
as a lawful permanent resident at the time of his removal.
79
 
Yet, they would have had difficulty escaping Martinez, where 
the Court held that if detention became unlawful, even 
inadmissible aliens who had been stopped at the border had a 
right to be released into the U.S.
80
 Additionally, petitioners in 
                                                          
73
  Id.  
74
  Id. at 24. 
75
  Id. at 25. 
76
  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001); Clark v. Martinez, 
543 U.S. 371 (2005). 
77
  Id. 
78
  Id.  
79
  Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 17, Kiyemba v. Obama, 
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1526934.  
80
  Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU in Support of the Petition for 
Certiorari at 8, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 
2009 WL 1304719.  
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Zadvydas and Martinez were ―adjudicated‖ as criminals and 
conditional release was still upheld.
81
 However, the Zadvydas 
Court proclaimed ―[n]either do we consider terrorism or other 
special circumstances where special arguments might be 
made for forms of preventive detention and for heightened 
deference to the judgments of the political branches with 
respect to matters of national security.‖
82
 Since petitioners in 
Kiyemba are neither enemy combatants, terrorists, nor pose a 
threat to our national security, they fall outside the 
qualifications made in Zadvydas.
83
  
B.  Can Mezei, Zydvydas, and Martinez be Reconciled? 
 It is clear that two competing principles are at stake in 
this discussion: The liberty interest of those who are 
unlawfully detained versus the sovereign right of a nation to 
exclude. At one end of the spectrum, applicants at the border 
receive minimal constitutional guarantees. Yet, can we say 
that those who have come involuntarily are applicants at the 
border? It is easy to argue that a greater duty is owed to those 
who have established permanent connections with the State, 
and are therefore justified in receiving greater constitutional 
protections. Nevertheless, in this scenario, what duty is owed 
to those we have brought involuntarily to our borders, who 
have no connections to the U.S., and who we have 
imprisoned for over eight years? In fighting a war, must we 
leave ourselves susceptible to inviting in those who for 
various reasons may not be designated enemy combatants? In 
the case of United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins,
84
 Judge 
Swan seemingly answers these difficult questions and 
                                                          
81
  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 27, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 
458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 934097.  
82
  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696 (2001). 
83
  Brief of Petitioners at 36, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536 ("The irony is that Petitioners 
present no threat to anyone (demonstrated by the Executive's 
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84
  United States ex rel. Bradley v. Watkins, 163 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 
1947). 
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poignantly denounces unchecked Executive authority, in the 
context of World War II, when he states: 
 
The theory that an alien can be seized on 
foreign soil by armed forces of the United 
States Navy, brought as a prisoner to our 
shores, turned over to immigration authorities 
as being an ―applicant for admission to the 
United States,‖ held in custody by them for 
nearly six years, and then deported to 
[Norway] by virtue of exclusion order savors 
of those very ideologies against which our 





In wrestling with these difficult questions, we evaluate 
the arguments and themes which intersect with immigration 
law and arose throughout the litigation proceedings. Briefly, 
the note will examine: The Executive's ―wind up‖ authority, 
―harborage‖, conditional release, and sovereignty. 
1.  ―Wind Up‖ Authority 
 Judge Urbina, in countering the government's assertions 
regarding its ―wind up‖ authority, presented a three-part test 
in determining its constitutionality. He succinctly explained 
that the authority to ―wind up‖ ceases when: ―(1) detention 
becomes effectively indefinite; (2) there is a reasonable 
certainty that petitioner will not return to the battlefield to 
fight against the U.S.; and (3) an alternative legal justification 
has not been provided for continued detention.‖
86
 The District 
Court reasoned that all three grounds have been met since the 
government is unable to relocate petitioners, there is no 
                                                          
85
  Brief of Petitioners at 39, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536 (quoting Bradley, 163 F.2d at 
332).  
86
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d 33, 38 
(D.D.C. 2008), rev'd sub nom. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. 
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dispute regarding petitioner's lack of membership or 
involvement with al Qaida or the Taliban, and that ―wind up‖ 
authority is an insufficient alternate legal justification for 
continued detention.
87
 Thus, the District Court found the 




 It is interesting that the Circuit Court I never considered 
the arguments regarding ―wind up‖ authority, which were 
raised by the government and answered by the District Court.  
However, in the government's Opposition Brief to the 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, it argued once again that the 
Executive has wartime authority and cited historical cases.
89
 
One case the government cited was the cease-fire in the 
Korean War where approximately 100,000 Chinese and 
North Koreans were held as POWs and were unable to return 
to their home countries.
90
 Resettlement of these individuals 
took over two years.
91
 The second case stems from the first 
Persian Gulf War where ―[t]housands of Iraqis were detained 
by the United States and its allies . . . because they refused to 
be repatriated to their native country.‖
92
 Notably, there was 
no mention of the time frame upon which it took to resettle 
these POWs. The government believes that these examples 
are dispositive of the U.S. right to ―house‖ detainees at 




 In Judge Roger's concurring opinion, she pointed out that 
the majority did not discuss the Executive's ―wind up‖ 
authority and notes that both the Geneva Conventions and 
U.S. Army policy ―require repatriation of POWs without 
                                                          
87
  In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litig., 581 F. Supp. 2d at 38.  
88
  Id. at 39. 
89
  Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 25, Kiyemba v. Obama, 
130 S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 1526934. 
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delay.‖
94
 Moreover, she addressed the lack of specificity in 
the government's period for holding the Iraqi detainees after 
the cessation of hostilities. According to the Department of 
Defense Report to Congress, over 80,000 POWs were 




 The problem with the government's argument is that these 
―petitioners . . . have never been treated as POWs, have been 
imprisoned  . . . for over seven years, and . . . the Executive's 
unsuccessful efforts to locate a suitable country for release 
had been on-going for more than five years.‖
96
 Another 
crucial distinction is the relative number of detainees in each 
situation. There is no doubt that it would be nearly impossible 
for the U.S. to absorb thousands of POWs, nor would it have 
a duty to assume such a responsibility. Nevertheless, there are 
only five petitioners remaining and such numbers do not 
create an overwhelming logistical, cost, or security 
dilemma.
97
 In responding to the government's argument, 
petitioners plainly asserted that where the Executive may 
need reasonable time to accommodate POWs, this concept 
does not apply to civilians, and more importantly, whatever 
―wind up‖ authority existed, ended with the decisions in 
Zadvydas and Martinez.
98
   
 Finally, neither the government, nor the Circuit Court I, 
discusses the possibility of conditional release and how that 
may mitigate the government's concerns.  
                                                          
94
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1033 n.2 (2009), vacated, 130 
S.Ct. 458 (2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 935637. (Rogers, J., 
concurring) (internal citation omitted). 
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  Id.  
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  Brief of Petitioners at 47, Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S.Ct. 458 
(2009) (No. 08-1234), 2009 WL 4709536 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 
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2.  Conditional Release 
 There is limited discussion about what steps could be 
taken to mitigate the concerns of the government in releasing 
petitioners into the U.S. Soon after his decision, Judge Urbina 
had scheduled a briefing with Homeland Security to discuss 
the details of a conditional release.
99
  However, the Circuit 
Court I granted an emergency stay of the proceeding pending 
its resolution of the case.
100
 Judge Rogers briefly described 
the ―detailed plan‖ as including: Help from organizations 
such as the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services, the 
President of the World Uighur Congress, housing with 
Uighur families, transportation, financial support and care.
101
  
 Nevertheless, Judge Urbina issued their immediate 
release one week prior to consultation with Homeland 
Security.
102
  The government raised a valid argument that it 
should be given ―a full opportunity to present any relevant 
information bearing on . . . the conditions of their release 
before taking the drastic step of ordering petitioners brought 
here.‖
103
 Frustrated by the Executive's delay tactics, Judge 
Urbina was unwilling to concede any more time to the 
government. Nonetheless, if the Circuit Court II on remand 
does issue petitioners' release, the government should be 
given a meaningful opportunity to present its arguments on 
permissible restrictions.  
 In seeking to strike a balance between the relative 
interests at stake, the Circuit Court II should also look at 
Zadvydas' instruction pending mandated release where ―such 
an order did not confer a legal right to ‗live at large‘ but 
                                                          
99
  Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022, 1034 (2009), vacated, 130 
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merely a right to be ‗supervis[ed] under release conditions 
that may not be violated.‘‖
104
 Moreover, our immigration 
statute allows for noncitizens to be released into the U.S. 
without conferring them any statutory rights.
105
 This 
mechanism of being a ―parolee‖ should allay the concerns of 
the government, since no legal status is conferred on the 
aliens and their entrance into the U.S. ―shall not be regarded 
as an admission of the alien.‖
106
 In weighing the interests at 
stake, conditional release provides a modicum of fairness, 
whereas, the government's concept of ―harborage‖ of 
petitioners seems nebulous at best. 
3. ―Harborage‖ 
 In a bold assessment, the government contended that 
petitioners were no longer detained and were currently being:  
 
housed at Guantanamo pending the 
identification of a third country where they 
may resettle. Petitioners are being housed in 
relatively unrestrictive conditions, given the 
status of Guantanamo as a U.S. military base. 
See J.A. 1246 & n.3 (describing conditions). 
Petitioners are in special communal housing 
with access to all areas of their camp, 
including an outdoor recreation space and 
picnic area. Petitioners sleep in an air-
conditioned bunk house, and have the use of 
an activity room equipped with various 
recreational items, including a television with 
VCR and DVD players. Petitioners also have 
                                                          
104
  Brief Amicus Curiae of the ACLU in Support of the Petition for 
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Even though petitioners' facilities have improved, they are 
still surrounded by razor wire fences and armed guards.
108
 
They have limited communication with the outside, and their 
only visitors are their lawyers and the Red Cross.
109
 Even 
Mezei had far more freedom, since he left by boat twice to 
European countries that ultimately denied him.
110
  Logically, 
―[a]s long as the prison gate is locked and the fence is 
patrolled, the prisoners are not released.‖
111
 
 A compelling argument against ―harborage‖ is that 
Mezei's situation was never termed a ―detention‖ by Justice 
Clark, rather, the terms or euphemisms employed by the 
government and the Circuit Court I such as: ―Harborage‖, 
―temporary haven‖, and ―exclusion" serve as a crucial 





 Both the government and Circuit Court I lay forth a 
plethora of case law supporting the Executive and 
Congressional authority to exclude aliens from entry into the 
U.S. Yet, they overlook a key question: Whether sovereignty 
is maintained by keeping individuals stateless?  Seemingly, 
the war on terror may continue for a generation or longer. If 
so, isn't the whole concept of sovereignty undermined by 
potentially creating a class of stateless people? Here, 
petitioners would likely be persecuted in their home country, 
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are not given POW status, and if the government prevails 
again at the Circuit Court II, it will be left with one final 
chance to seek a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court 
while having spent over a decade in detention.  
 Ultimately, the government must realize that this void, or 
black hole, is mostly of its own doing. Although it continued 
to make references to the petitioner's connections to al Qaida 
or the Taliban through affiliations with Eastern Turkistan 
Islamic Movement, both the District Court and Circuit Court 
I seemed satisfied with the decision in Parhat, ―that the 
government had not presented sufficient evidence that the 
Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement was associated with al 
Qaida or the Taliban, or had engaged in hostilities against the 
United States.‖
113
 Thus, by penalizing those who are 
unlawfully detained, especially where there is no 
countervailing security threat, fundamental principles of 
fairness and due process will inevitably be eroded.  It is 
crucial to remember Zadvydas' poignant assertion that the 
political branches' plenary power is ―subject to important 
constitutional limitations.‖
114
    
 The key distinction in this debate rests on the 
voluntariness or involuntariness of the alien to find himself at 
the threshold of the U.S. border. If the U.S. were compelled 
to take enemy aliens entrenched at our gate, U.S. sovereignty 
would be compromised.  However, the compulsion here is 
different. First, petitioners were brought to our border, then 
their status was changed by the government to reflect that 
they were no longer considered enemy combatants, and 
finally, U.S. laws preclude the government from sending 
petitioners to their home country for fear of torture or 
mistreatment. There is no external force that compels us to 
release petitioners into the U.S.; it is our own principle of 
justice that mandates such release, and thus, our sovereignty 
is preserved by the same laws which breathe life into its core. 
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 Though the government vigorously denies that Martinez 
judicially compelled the release of these petitioners because it 
is based on statutory construction; whenever a ―serious 
constitutional threat is raised by reading a statute to permit 
indefinite detention, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance 
applies.‖
115
 Therefore, since no express detention power 
exists in the Authorized Use of Military Force (AUMF), the 
constitutional presumption in both Zadvydas and Martinez 




 It is imperative to keep in mind that unchecked Executive 
authority allowed for the use of indefinite detention during 
the Alien Sedition Acts of 1798 and Japanese internment of 
World War II.
117
 Each incident was given official sanction 
because they were cloaked in the language of protecting 
national security. These events serve as perpetual reminders 
that tremendous caution must always be taken when 
restricting liberty.  Nevertheless, the world cannot continue to 
be a repository for America's mistakes and miscalculations 
when addressing the war on terror. The government needs to 
find a mechanism that does not first designate individuals as 
enemy combatants aligned with terrorists and then later seek 
their removal hoping that other nations will willingly 
embrace them.   
 In this scenario, where petitioners are not considered a 
threat to the U.S., it behooves the U.S. government to take 
responsibility for involuntarily bringing petitioners to the 
threshold of our gates. How can the U.S. correct its mistake 
of detaining those who have not been charged with a crime 
for over eight years, if its only remedy is to keep them in the 
same prison but with fewer restrictions? In the attempt to 
analogize or distinguish the various immigration cases, the 
                                                          
115
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reasonable conclusion is that no case neatly resolves the 
impasse.   
 Both parties have compelling support. However, without 
recognizing that the Constitution permits some limitation on 
the political branches, the result is an unfettered discretion 
over the lives of unlawfully detained individuals. Ironically, 
maintaining America's sovereignty leads to acts which erode 
fairness and due process; the fundamentals on which that 
sovereignty rests are themselves compromised. Even if the 
government takes an uncompromising stand, society is 
unlikely to tolerate such injustice; as was seen with Mezei 
eventually being paroled into the country.
118
 Whereas Mezei 
represents the high-water mark of governmental authority, 
much criticism from both the judiciary and scholars has 
substantially eroded its impact.
119
 
 There are potential alternatives to placate both parties. 
One way is for the government to set terms for the condition 
of petitioners' release and ―parole‖ them into the U.S. without 
conferring any rights that ―accompany admission or entry.‖
120
 
Even Mezei found that an individual paroled into the country 
maintains the status as one ―on the threshold of initial 
entry.‖
121
 This mechanism seems to ideally balance the 
Separation of Powers Doctrine (balancing the individual 
domains of the three branches of government) and elevates 
petitioners' argument that Zadvydas and Martinez reject any 
notion that releasing aliens into the U.S. exceeds judicial 
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